ABSTRACT

This article examines the pervasive phenomenon of political defection in Nigeria between 2015 and 2025 and its far-reaching implications for constitutional democracy, political accountability, and governance stability. Anchored on the constitutional framework established under Sections 68(1)(g) and 109(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), it explores how Nigeria’s judiciary has interpreted and applied these provisions amidst recurring political realignments and shifting partisan affiliations.

Drawing from landmark judicial pronouncements such as Ifedayo Sunday Abegunde v. Ondo State House of Assembly & Ors (2015)¹, PDP v. INEC & 20 Others (2022)², and the Ebonyi State House of Assembly Defection Case (2022)³, the article highlights the judiciary’s evolving role in defining the constitutional limits of defection and protecting the integrity of electoral mandates. These cases collectively reaffirm that political authority constitutionally emanates from the sponsoring political party rather than the individual officeholder, while also revealing the complexities inherent in enforcing these provisions across varying political contexts.

The article, however, situates political defection within a broader institutional framework, arguing that it is less a matter of personal opportunism and more reflective of systemic challenges within Nigeria’s political and party structures. Weak internal democracy, factional disputes, lack of ideological consistency, and procedural irregularities within political parties often contribute to the conditions that precipitate defections.

By examining the intersection between constitutional interpretation, political practice, and institutional functionality, the article concludes that persistent defections signify a deeper governance challenge rooted in institutional fragility rather than individual misconduct. It emphasizes that while judicial interpretation has clarified the constitutional boundaries of defection, sustainable political accountability depends on strengthening institutional mechanisms and ensuring consistent application of judicial principles across all levels of governance.

INTRODUCTION

Political defection, popularly referred to in Nigeria as cross-carpeting, has become one of the most defining and persistent features of the nation’s democratic experience since the return to civil rule in 1999. Once regarded as an isolated act of dissent or ideological divergence, defection has evolved into an entrenched institutional challenge within Nigeria’s political framework. Between 2015 and 2025, the scale and frequency of defections reached unprecedented levels, transforming what was once exceptional into a predictable element of Nigeria’s electoral cycle.

This phenomenon reflects not merely shifting personal loyalties but the structural deficiencies within Nigeria’s political parties, particularly their weak ideological orientation, limited internal democracy, and inability to effectively manage dissent. Political parties often operate less as institutions of democratic engagement and more as platforms for patronage and power negotiation. Consequently, exclusionary practices, internal rivalries, and uneven power distribution within party hierarchies have compelled many political actors to seek alternative affiliations as a means of political survival.

A defining moment in this trajectory occurred during the 2015 general elections, a pivotal juncture in Nigeria’s political evolution. After sixteen consecutive years in power, the then ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) experienced significant internal discontent, leadership disputes, and allegations of imposition and marginalization. Several governors, federal legislators, and other key political figures defected to the newly formed All Progressives Congress (APC), a coalition of opposition parties including the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), and the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). These defections, often rationalized on grounds of inadequate internal democracy within the PDP, fundamentally altered Nigeria’s political equilibrium and contributed to the APC’s historic victory in 2015, the first democratic transfer of power from an incumbent ruling party to the opposition in the Fourth Republic (Premium Times, December 2014)⁴.

Since then, political defections have assumed a cyclical pattern, intensifying in the build-up to every major election. Between 2018 and 2023, Nigeria witnessed repeated waves of political migration across party lines, frequently motivated not by ideological realignment but by intraparty conflicts, perceived exclusion, and strategic calculations for electoral advantage. The resulting fluidity of allegiance has blurred the policy and philosophical boundaries that should ordinarily distinguish political parties, reducing them to transient vehicles for ambition and electoral access rather than enduring institutions of governance.

Constitutionally, defection has also sparked significant legal and political discourse. Section 68(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which provides that: 

“A member of the Senate or of the House of Representatives shall vacate his seat in the House of which he is a member if- being a person whose election to the House was sponsored by a political party, he becomes a member of another political party before the expiration of the period for which that House was elected: Provided that his membership of the latter political party is not as a result of a division in the political party of which he was previously a member or of a merger of two or more political parties or factions by one of which he was previously sponsored.”  and Section 109(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which provides that: 

“A member of a House of Assembly shall vacate his seat in the House if- being a person whose election to the House was sponsored by a political party, he becomes a member of another political party before the expiration of the period for which that House was elected: Provided that his membership of the latter political party is not as a result of a division in the political party of which he was previously a member or of a merger of two or more political parties or factions by one of which he was previously sponsored.”

The above-quoted sections prohibit legislators (State and Federal) from abandoning the political parties on whose platform they were elected, except where such a party is “divided” or “merged” with another. However, the Constitution remains silent on defections by executive officeholders such as Presidents, Governors, and Local Government Chairpersons, a gap that has been repeatedly exploited for political advantage. This constitutional silence underscores the broader institutional imbalance between law and practice, where weak enforcement mechanisms and selective application of constitutional provisions enable political actors to navigate around accountability structures for expedient purposes.

The decade between 2015 and 2025 therefore, encapsulates both political volatility and institutional fragility. The persistence of defections during this period illustrates how weak party institutionalization, deficient internal governance, and the absence of ideological commitment have undermined Nigeria’s democratic consolidation. In this sense, political defection in Nigeria is best understood not as a series of isolated acts of disloyalty but as a reflection of deeper institutional challenges within the country’s evolving democratic system.

THE BACKDROP: POLITICAL DEFECTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY

The decade between 2015 and 2025 marks one of the most dynamic and turbulent periods in Nigeria’s democratic evolution, particularly concerning the pattern of political defections. During this era, defections became not only frequent but systemic, reflecting the deeper institutional weaknesses within political parties and the broader governance framework.

Between 2018 and 2019, as the general elections approached, Nigeria witnessed a significant wave of defections from the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) to the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Governors Samuel Ortom (Benue), Abdulfatah Ahmed (Kwara), and Aminu Waziri Tambuwal (Sokoto) publicly cited internal divisions, exclusion, and a lack of inclusiveness within the APC as reasons for their departure (Vanguard, July 2018)⁵. Their exit, alongside that of over fifty federal lawmakers, including then Senate President Bukola Saraki, revealed the fragility of internal party democracy and the recurring tensions between centralized party leadership and member participation.

Conversely, the years 2020 to 2023 witnessed a reverse movement, as numerous politicians migrated from opposition parties to the ruling APC. This shift was driven in part by the institutionalization of patronage networks and the prevailing perception that proximity to federal power enhances political protection and access to state resources. The Edo State episode of 2020 exemplifies this pattern: Governor Godwin Obaseki defected to the PDP after being disqualified from the APC primaries (The Cable, June 2020)⁶. His defection underscored how internal party management issues and leadership imbalances could precipitate cross-party movements. Similarly, the 2021 defection of Governor Ben Ayade from the PDP to the APC sparked widespread political realignment across Cross River State (Vanguard, May 2021)⁷, again highlighting the institutional fragility of party systems.

The Supreme Court’s decision in David Umahi v. PDP (2022)⁸ reaffirmed the constitutional position that political offices constitutionally belong to political parties rather than individual officeholders. However, the practical enforcement of this principle remains uneven. The persistence of factional conflicts, selective compliance, and weak institutional mechanisms for party discipline have limited the effectiveness of judicial interventions in curbing unconstitutional defections.

By 2025, political defection had become an entrenched feature of Nigeria’s democratic practice, often employed as a strategic tool for political negotiation, electoral repositioning, or alignment with dominant coalitions. This pattern illustrates that Nigeria’s defection challenge transcends questions of personal ambition or moral failure. It is fundamentally an institutional issue, rooted in systemic dysfunction, weak party organization, inadequate enforcement structures, and the absence of a stable ideological foundation across political platforms.

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

The judiciary has remained a pivotal arbiter in shaping the constitutional understanding of political defection in Nigeria. In the absence of strong institutional enforcement mechanisms within the political system, the courts have frequently been called upon to interpret the scope and consequence of defections, particularly as they relate to the sanctity of electoral mandates. Through a series of landmark pronouncements, including Abegunde v. Ondo State House of Assembly (2015)¹, PDP v. INEC & 20 Others (2022)², and the Ebonyi State House of Assembly Defection Case (2022)³, the judiciary has consistently emphasized that political power and electoral mandates are attributes of the political party, not the individual officeholder.

In Abegunde v. Ondo State House of Assembly, the Supreme Court established a defining precedent in Nigeria’s jurisprudence on defection. The Court held unequivocally that a legislator who abandons the political party upon which platform he was elected, without clear and provable evidence of division or merger within that party, automatically forfeits the seat. In her lead judgment, Justice Kekere-Ekun observed that the electoral process in Nigeria is structured around party-based representation, such that the electorate’s vote is fundamentally a mandate to the political party rather than a personal endorsement of the candidate. This position reinforced the supremacy of the party system in representative governance and was designed to discourage opportunistic cross-carpeting, which undermines the stability and coherence of legislative institutions.

In PDP v. INEC & 20 Others (2022), the Federal High Court adopted this reasoning in declaring vacant the seats of twenty lawmakers who defected from the PDP to the APC without any established division in their party. The Court held that the votes that produced the lawmakers were cast for the PDP and not for the individuals, and therefore, their continued occupation of the seats after defection was unconstitutional.

Similarly, in the Ebonyi State House of Assembly Defection Case (2022), the Court applied the same constitutional principle by declaring the seats of sixteen lawmakers vacant following their defection from the PDP to the APC alongside the Governor. The judgment reiterated that the Constitution does not envisage political officeholders floating between parties at will and reaffirmed the principle that mandates belong to political parties and not to individuals.

Despite the clarity of these judicial principles, their practical application continues to face institutional and political resistance. The weakness of legislative enforcement mechanisms and the pervasive culture of political expediency often undermine compliance with judicial orders. Consequently, while the judiciary has consistently clarified the constitutional position on defection, enforcement remains sporadic and selective, eroding public confidence in constitutional governance and perpetuating a cycle of political impunity.

Yet, even with such definitive pronouncements, the persistent recurrence of defections between 2015 and 2025 demonstrates the limits of judicial authority when confronted with entrenched political culture and systemic institutional decay. While the courts may interpret and clarify constitutional provisions, the implementation of their rulings ultimately depends on the willingness of political institutions to adhere to the rule of law. The judiciary, therefore, operates within a constrained environment, its decisions carrying moral and legal weight, but often lacking the coercive enforcement necessary to effect systemic change.

In this regard, judicial intervention, though indispensable, can only provide a framework for accountability. The deeper problem lies within the political system itself: the absence of internal party democracy, weak ethical standards, and the pervasive influence of patronage networks. Without institutional reforms to strengthen party governance and enhance compliance with judicial directives, the problem of defection will persist as a recurring challenge to Nigeria’s constitutional democracy. The judiciary’s pronouncements, while vital to maintaining legal clarity, must thus be complemented by proactive institutional mechanisms and political will if Nigeria’s democratic process is to achieve enduring stability.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The persistence of political defections between 2015 and 2025 has had profound implications for Nigeria’s democratic consolidation, exposing the fragility of its political institutions and the limits of constitutional enforcement. What initially appeared as isolated acts of political disloyalty have evolved into a systemic pattern that undermines the principles of representation, accountability, and institutional stability. The frequency of defections has not only weakened party cohesion but has also distorted the essence of the electoral mandate, thereby eroding public confidence in democratic institutions.

At the heart of this institutional crisis lies the disconnect between the constitutional ideals of political representation and the operational realities of party politics. The Nigerian Constitution envisages a representative democracy in which political parties serve as vehicles of ideological expression, policy continuity, and citizen participation. However, the conduct of political actors and the internal structure of the parties themselves have subverted this ideal. Instead of functioning as platforms for democratic engagement, political parties have largely become instruments for personal ambition, patronage distribution, and access to state resources. The absence of internal democracy, manifested in candidate imposition, factional dominance, and the marginalization of dissenting voices, creates an atmosphere in which defection becomes both a symptom and a strategy for political survival.

This institutional weakness extends beyond the political parties to the legislative and electoral frameworks. The National Assembly, which should serve as a guardian of constitutional fidelity, has often failed to enforce judicial pronouncements regarding defections. Legislative inertia and political complicity have created a dual system in which constitutional principles exist in theory but remain inconsistently applied in practice. This inconsistency not only undermines the rule of law but also fosters a perception that political power operates above institutional accountability.

Moreover, the Constitution’s selective silence on the defection of executive officeholders, such as the President, Governors, and Local Government Chairmen, has further compounded the problem. While Sections 68(1)(g) and 109(1)(g) provide clear sanctions for legislators, the absence of parallel provisions for executives has produced an asymmetry in accountability. This gap allows Governors and Presidents to defect without constitutional consequence, thereby perpetuating a sense of impunity. The resulting imbalance weakens the institutional coherence of the political system and blurs the boundaries of constitutional responsibility.

The cumulative effect of these institutional failures is the erosion of ideological distinction among political parties. Between 2015 and 2025, Nigeria’s major political parties, the APC, PDP, and other regional movements. have increasingly resembled one another in structure and orientation, lacking coherent ideological foundations. Defections have become less about principle and more about positioning, often occurring in response to shifting power dynamics rather than genuine policy disagreements. This ideological vacuum diminishes voter trust, as citizens perceive parties as interchangeable vehicles of ambition rather than genuine representatives of collective interest.

From a governance standpoint, frequent defections disrupt policy continuity, fragment legislative agendas, and dilute the sense of accountability between elected officials and their constituencies. Governments spend more time managing political alignments than addressing developmental priorities, while opposition parties remain preoccupied with reabsorbing defectors rather than articulating alternative policy visions. In this context, democracy risks becoming procedural rather than substantive, a system characterized by elections and party changes, but devoid of stable institutions, ideological clarity, or enduring governance principles.

Ultimately, the phenomenon of political defection represents not just a legal or political issue but an institutional challenge that touches the very foundation of Nigeria’s democratic project. Judicial pronouncements, though valuable, can only operate within the boundaries of institutional integrity. Unless political parties are restructured to embody transparency, internal democracy, and ideological conviction, defections will continue to undermine Nigeria’s democracy. Strengthening institutional frameworks, through consistent enforcement of judicial decisions, reform of party constitutions, and civic education on political accountability, remains essential for transforming Nigeria’s democracy from one driven by expediency to one anchored in constitutional discipline and institutional maturity.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Between 2015 and 2025, political defections in Nigeria revealed deep institutional weaknesses rather than mere personal disloyalty. Political parties, lacking ideology, internal democracy, and transparency, have become unstable and prone to factional crises. As a result, defection often serves as a response to systemic failures within parties.

Although the judiciary, through cases like Abegunde v. Ondo State House of Assembly (2015), PDP v. INEC & 20 Others (2022), and the Ebonyi State House of Assembly Defection Case (2022), has consistently clarified that electoral mandates belong to political parties, weak enforcement by party organs and legislatures allows impunity to persist. The 2022 cases therefore underscore the need for stronger party institutions, credible internal processes, and consistent application of judicial principles.

Sustainable democracy in Nigeria depends on institutional reform, ensuring fairness, inclusiveness, and ideological coherence, so that defection becomes an exception justified only by genuine divisions, not a recurring symptom of political dysfunction.

REFERENCES

1.     Ifedayo Sunday Abegunde v. Ondo State House of Assembly & Ors (2015) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1461) 314.

2.  Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) v. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) & Ors (Federal High Court, Abuja, Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/975/2021, 21 March 2022). — Cross River State House of Assembly Defection Case.

3.  Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) v. Nwifuru Francis Ogbonna & Ors (Federal High Court, Abuja, Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/920/2022, 8 March 2022). — Ebonyi State House of Assembly Defection Case.

4.    Premium Times (2014, December 1). Defection tsunami: How PDP lost five governors to APC. Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com

5.     Vanguard Newspapers (2018, July 25). Defection gale hits APC as Saraki, Tambuwal, Ortom, and others dump ruling party. Retrieved from

6.  The Cable (2020, June 17). Obaseki joins PDP after disqualification from APC primaries. Retrieved from https://www.thecable.ng

7.     Vanguard (2021). ‘Governor Ben Ayade Dumps PDP for APC.’ May 2021.

8.   Supreme Court of Nigeria (2022). David Umahi & Anor. v. Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), SC/CV/184/2022 (Judgment delivered 8 March 2022).